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James J. Opaluch
Economists since Pigou have advocated the
use of economic incentives for controlling en-
vironmental degradation. In a similar vein,
environmental economists have long lamented
a near unanimous reliance of environmental
policy on the use of direct regulation, How-
ever, several pieces of legislation, as well as
common law doctrine, provide strict liability
for damages from a variety of pollution inci-
dents. The term strict liability means that a
polluter is liable for the penalty imposed for a
pollution incident irrespective of intent, fault,
or even knowledge of the pollution incident. 1
Negligence need not be proved, thus strict
liability allows for no defense of due care or
conformance with common practice.
By making the polluter financially responsi-
ble for the damages from a pollution incident,
strict liability for damages can potentially in-
ternalize pollution externalities, and thus can
be viewed as a form of economic incentives
for pollution control. However, despite the
fact that financial liability is provided by sev-
eral pieces of current legislation, their role as a
practical policy tool for controlling pollution
does not seem to be widely recognized within
the environmental economics literature.
This is not to say that economists have to-
tally ignored the potential role of liability
rules, Going back to Cease (1960), for exam-
ple, a quite rich literature has examined theo-
retical implications of liability rules.2 How-
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1The various pieces of legislation contain some form of exemp-
tion for incidents caused solely by an act of war, by acts of a third
party or by grave, unanticipated natural disasters which are excep-
tional, inevitable, and irresistible, the effects of which cannot be
prevented or avoided. Third party exemptions will be briefly dis-
cussed below.
2 Also see Brown, 1973; Diamond, 1974; Shaven, 1974;
Polinsky, 1979; Greenwood and Ingene, 1978; and Just and Zil-
berman, 1979; among others,
ever, with the exception of a relatively small
number of articles specifically addressing the
issue of oil spills, and largely within the legal
literature, liability rules as a practical form of
economic incentives for pollution control have
not received wide discussion within the
mainstream of environmental economics, 3For
example, several recent articles enumerate
and examine market type institutions em-
ployed by current environmental regulation,
but do not even mention strict liability.
This paper first reviews strict liability as
provided by environmental legislation, with
particular emphasis on its role in hazardous
pollution events. The discussion will be
somewhat broader than hazardous waste
management, in that it will include pollution
by hazardous substances which may be valu-
able commodities prior to the pollution inci-
dent. This may include, for example, spills of
fuel oil or leakage from underground gasoline
storage tanks. We will see that current legisla-
tion provides various forms of strict liability
for hazardous pollution events. Liability for
such events is shown to be consistent with
common law doctrine on strict liability, and
may be particularly useful given institutions
provided by other legislation, notably the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976.
The paper then constructs a brief concep-
tual framework for liability for pollution inci-
dents, and presents some simulation results
concerning perceptions of the probability of a
hazardous pollution incident.
Strict LiabWy in Environmental
Regulation
Several pieces of legislation provide liability
rules for a variety of costs from certain types
3 Bradley, 1974; Polinsky, l~9; Conrad, 1980; White and
Wittman, 1981; Russell, 1981; Anderson, 1983; and Opaluch and
Grigalunas, 1984, the only empirical piece.Opaluch Hazurdous Waste Accidents 211
of pollution incidents. Even more basic, how-
ever, is the foundation of strict liability within
common law doctrine. While considerable
leeway remains for individual decisions, strict
liability appears to be accepted by the courts
in cases of abnormally dangerous conditions
or activities. Key factors in determining if an
activity is “abnormally dangerous” include
the degree of risk or harm which may result;
whether society should expect complete pro-
tection from such risk; whether the activity is
inappropriate or uncommon practice for the
location in which it occurs.
Thus, for example, day to day emissions of
sulfur dioxide from a power plant, although
hazardous, would not fall under the common
law doctrine of strict liability since they are a
normal part of operations, unavoidable under
common practices and are “appropriate” for
their location in a properly located power
plant. On the other hand, a spill of rare toxic
materials into a water supply should be avoid-
able and is not commonplace (we hope), and
thus would fall under the strict liability guide-
lines. There does, however, seem to be some
movement by the courts towards imposing
strict liability in all cases of particular danger,
whether “normal” or otherwise, with the rea-
soning that a person engaged in a dangerous
activity should bear the costs of that danger
(Rodgers, 1976). Hence, under common law
doctrine strict liability tends to be upheld for
incidents such as spills of hazardous sub-
stances.
Given the philosophical underpinnings of
strict liability within common law, it is not
surprising that current environmental legisla-
tion provides strict liability for hazardous pol-
lution accidents, The remainder of this section
will briefly review liability rules provided by
several pieces of environmental legislation.
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
(Refuse Act)
The Refuse Act prohibits discharge into
navigable waters of”. . , any refuse matter of
any kind or description whatever other than
that flowing from the streets and sewers and
passing therefrom in a liquid state. ” Also for-
bidden is depositing “. . . any material of any
kind in any place on the bank of any navigable
water , , . where the same shall be liable to be
washed into such navigable water. . . .‘’
The Rivers and Harbors Act is considered a
strict liability statute in that the penalty is im-
posed without question of fault, intent, mis-
take, or even knowledge of the occurrence.
While the Act has no specific statement con-
cerning private parties receiving compensa-
tion for damages of an incident which violates
the Act, “. . . the trend in cases favors imply-
ing Civil remedies , . . to the advantage of
damaged parties” (Rodgers, 1976). Thus,
even the first piece of the environmental legis-
lation has been interpreted as providing a form
of strict liability for damages.
The Clean Water Act
In its various amended versions, section311 of
the Clean Water Act establishes a form of
strict liability for the discharge of oil or
hazardous substances ‘‘. . . into or upon the
navigable waters of the United States, or ad-
joining shorelines or waters of the contiguous
zone. ” Up to established limits on liability,
and with certain limited defenses, the polluter
“ . . . shall be liable . . . for a civil penalty per
discharge . . . based on toxicity, degradability
and dispersal characteristics of such sub-
stances. ” Thus, liability provided by the
Clean Water Act is in fact closer to an emis-
sion charge, in that the damages from the ac-
tual incident need not be determined. This is
even more clear in the 1977 version which
imposes “. . . a penalty determined by the
number of units discharged multiplied by the
amount established for such unit . . . ,‘’ where
this amount is ‘‘. . , based on the toxicity,
degradability, and dispersal characteristics of
the substance. ” Note that the unit charge is
removed from the 1982 version, which re-
quires that “ (t)he Administrator shall . . .
conduct a study and report to Congress on
methods, mechanisms, and procedures to
create incentives to achieve a higher standard
of care in all aspects of the management and
movement of hazardous substances. ” To be
included in this study is liability for third party
damages, penalties, fees, and whether the unit
charge described in the 1977 version of the
Clean Water Act should be imposed.
One difficult y with penalties under the
C1ean Water Act is that they are based only on
the characteristics of the substance, and not
on the social damage done. Since damages are
likely to vary considerably depending upon
location of the pollution incident, any financial
incentive should most strongly discourage ac-
tivities in particularly sensitive locations.212 October 1984
Since the penalty provided for hazardous pol-
lution under the Clean Water Act to not vary
according to the potential for damage, no in-
centive is provided for locating hazardous ac-
tivities away from particularly sensitive areas.
An optimal incentive scheme should encour-
age appropriate siting of such activities
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
of 1978 (OCS Lands Act)
Sections 303 and 304 of the OCS Lands Act










injury to, or destruction of, real or personal
property;
10ss of use of real or personal property;
injury to, or destruction of, natural re-
sources;
loss of use of natural resources;
loss of profits or impairment of earning
capacity due to injury to, or destruction of,
real or personal property or natural re-
sources; and
loss of tax revenue for a period of one year
due to injury to real or personal property.
This is perhaps the most comprehensive
statement of strict liability, in that it
explicitly includes non-commercial natural
resources damaged, in addition to third
party damages and indirect loss of profits.
This would include lost profits to fisher-
men and to recreation-related business
which result from damages to natural re-
sources. Liability is subject to upper end
limits and to usual limited defenses.
The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA)
CERCLA, the so-called Superfund Act,
provides liability, compensation, cleanup,
and emergency response for hazardous
substances released into the environment
and provides for the cleanup of inactive
hazardous waste dump sites. Subject to
limits on maximum liability and the usual
defenses section 107 of CERCLA estab-
lishes liability for
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action in-
curred by the United States Government or a
State not inconsistent with the national con-
tingency plan;
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(B) any other necessary costs of response in-
curred by any other person consistent with the
national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss
of natural resources, including reasonable costs
of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss re-
sulting from such a release.
Note that liability for damages to third
parties is not explicitly provided by
CERCLA, except for damages to natural
resources, where it is specified that “. . .
liability shall be to the United States Gov-
ernment and to any State for natural re-
sources within the State or belonging to,
managed by, controlled by, or appertain-
ing to such State. ” However, it is re-
peatedly emphasized that ‘‘(n)othing in
this paragraph shall affect or modify in any
way the obligations or liability of any per-
son under any provision of State or Fed-
eral law, including common law, for dam-
ages, injury, or loss resulting from a re-
lease of any hazardous substance. . . .“
Hence, CERCLA appears to take a
weaker path of relying on common law
doctrine for third party damages, other
than cleanup, remedial actions, and dam-
ages to government owned natural re-
sources. Compare this to the OCS Lands
Act which explicitly provides strict liabil-
ity for damages to real or personal prop-
erty and lost profits or impairment of earn-
ing capacity. Since uncertain y concerning
court decisions under the vague common
law doctrine may lead to incomplete inter-
nalization, there appears to be a need for a
more comprehensive definition of damages
for which a firm is held liable under
CERCLA.
Several additional provisions of
CERCLA deserve mention. CERCLA
holds as liable for damages from the re-
lease of a hazardous substance
(1) the owner of a vessel (otherwise subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States) or a facility;
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any
facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed ofi
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or
otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or
arranged with a transporter for transport to dis-
posal or treatment of hazardous substances
owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility owned or
operated by another party or entity and con-
tained such hazardous substances; andOpaluch Hazardous Waste Accidents 213
(4) any person who accepts or accepted hazard-
ous substances for transport to disposal or
treatment facilities or sites selected by such per-
son, from which there is a release or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response
costs of a hazardous substance. . . .
Under CERCLA, liability is maintained when
the substance is controlled by”. . . one whose
act or omission occurs in connection with a
contractual relationship, existing directly or
indirectly with the defendant. . . .‘’ The indi-
vidual is relieved of liability when the sub-
stance is controlled by a contracted third party
only if
. . the defendant establishes by a preponderance of
the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with re-
spect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking
into consideration the characteristics of such hazard-
ous substance, in light of all relevant facts and cir-
cumstances and (b) he took precautions against
foreseeable acts or omissions of such third party and
the consequences that could foreseeably result from
such acts and omissions.
Compare this with the OCS Lands Act which
exempts liability”. . . if the incident is caused
by the negligence or intentional act of the
damaged party, or any third party . . .,” or
with the Clean Water Act which exempts the
individual from Iiabilit y in the case of”. . . an
act or omission of another party without re-
gard to whether such act or omission was or
was not negligent, . . .‘’
Thus, unlike other pieces of environmental
legislation, liability under CERCLA extends
beyond the individual responsible for the op-
eration in which the spill occurs, but includes
all those involved in the process, Each indi-
vidual is held jointly and severally liable,
which means that any single party can be held
responsible for the entire cost when other par-
ties cannot be found or are insolvent, defunct,
or bankrupt.
While inclusion in liability under CERCLA,
despite the fault of a third party, may at first
appear excessive, the intent is to ensure that
all those involved in the process, from the time
of generation to disposal, are responsible ac-
tors and that each will take care to involve
only other reputable individuals. The fear is
that generators could avoid Iiability by hiring a
low-cost transporter who maintains a “fly-
by-night” operation. Since proper disposal of
hazardous wastes can cost 10 to 50 times as
much as improper disposal (Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality, 1982), there is a need to
provide incentives for all actors to utilize repu-
table transport, disposaI, and treatment ser-
vices. Thus, by extending liability beyond
physical custody of the hazardous substance,
CERCLA provides economic incentives for
ensuring proper final disposal,
For cases where the liable party cannot be
located, CERCLA creates the Hazardous
Substance Response Trust Fund, which is
financed 86% through taxes which range from
22g to $4.87 per ton on various hazardous sub-
stances. The remainder of the fund is appro-
priated from general revenues by Congress.
An additional important provision of
CERCLA is its approach to dealing with inac-
tive dump sites. At the time of closure of the
dump site, operations which have complied
with regulation of the Solid Waste Disposal
Act are issued a permit under the Act. Ninety
days after closure, liability is transferred to the
Post-closure Liability Fund, which is estab-
lished by section 232 of CERCLA. The Liabil-
ity Fund is financed by a tax of $2.13 per dry
weight ton of hazardous wastes when received
by a qualified hazardous waste disposal facil-
ity. Hence, at the time of closure of a hazard-
ous waste facility, the philosophy of regulation
shifts from strict liability to a technology forc-
ing strategy under the Solid Waste Disposal
Act.
A Conceptual Framework
This section will present a conceptual frame-
work for the firm’s choice of accident avoid-
ance technology. The framework described in
this section is similar to that contained in Con-
rad (1980), who discusses the policy implica-
tions in some detail. Thus, this section will
briefly sketch the conceptual framework, and
will discuss the perceptions issue to be exam-
ined with the simulation model. The reader
interested in further details concerning the
conceptual framework and its policy implica-
tions is referred to the Conrad paper.
The firm is assumed to be risk neutral, in
that its objective is to maximize expected
profits. For the purpose of this section, the
only random variables are the occurrence of
pollution incidents, X, and the amount of the
substance released, S, The occurrence of inci-
dents is assumed to follow a discrete probabil-
ity density function
f(X = x) = P(xIT,Q) for x = O, 1, 2, . . .
where T is an index of spill control technology214 October 1984 NJARE
which is linear in costs, and Q is the total
quantity of hazardous substances processed.
Given that a pollution incident occurs, the
amount released in the incident is assumed to
be independent and identically distributed ac-
cording to the continuous probability density
function g(S), for S >0.
Expected profits can be expressed as
(1) E(m) = ~ J(R(Q)
*=0
- l(S) – cQT)g(S)dS P(XIQ,T)
where R(“) represents net revenues, ignoring
costs of spills and spill avoidance technology,
1(S) represents the loss in profits due to the
spill, c represents the unit cost of increasing
the spill control technology index, and T rep-
resents the level of technology employed. The
lost profits due to a spill, l(S), is made up of
three components: the value of the hazardous
substance released, if any, the liability for so-
cial damages, and cleanup or control costs.
This lost profits can, thus, be expressed as
(2) l(S) = ps + d(S) + CC(S)
where p is the value of the spilled substance,
d(S) is the social damages from the spill, and
cc(S) is the cleanup and control costs.
Equation (1) can be rewritten as
E(T) = R(Q) – cQT
- j Pads P(X{Q,T)
~=o
= R(Q) - cQT – ~L P(XIQ,T)
~=o
where L is the expected loss in profits per
spill. The optimal solutions for production and
spill avoidance technology can be charac-
terized by the first order conditions
~ ~p(xlQ)T) _ cT=O
dQ
These equations show that if firms maximize
expected profits and to the extent that L re-
flects all social costs of spills, and the firm has
the proper perceptions of the derivatives
dP(”)/dQ and dP(”)/dT, strict liability will
properly internalize social costs of potential
spills and will lead to optimal decisions con-
cerning production and spill avoidance tech-
nology. However, these are very strong as-
sumptions, Equation (2) states
1(S) = ps + d(S) + CC(S)
and, hence,
L=pE(S)+D+CC
where D is the expected social damage from a
spill and CC is the expected control and
cleanup costs. In the absence of insurance, the
firm will face the value of the lost hazardous
substance. Under ideal conditions, strict liabil-
ity would lead to internalization of expected
social damages and cleanup costs. However,
as discussed above and by Conrad, current
legislation does not achieve full internaliza-
tion. Further than that, even given perfect in-
stitutions, we do not have sufficient under-
standing to accurately estimate the social
damages of spills. More research in damage
estimation is extremely important in improv-
ing the accuracy of estimates of social dam-
ages, hence providing more appropriate levels
of incentives for spill avoidance.
The second important factor in the effec-
tiveness of strict liability is the accuracy of
firms’ perceptions of the probability of acci-
dents and the effects of avoidance technology
and the level of production on this probabilityy.
In the case of low probability occurrences, it is
often argued that perceptions of probabilities
are inaccurate, at least in part because experi-
ence with incidents is so rare. In such cases
observing the frequency of incidents may not
be a practical or desirable method of calculat-
ing probabilities. Faced with low probability
events to be considered, decision makers are
often argued to employ heuristic decision mak-
ing processes, rather than “rational” maximi-
zation of expected profits (Simon, 1955;
Tversky and Kahnemann, 1974; Shoemaker,
1982; Conrad, 1980). Expectations may be de-
rived from frequent or representative cases,
viewing low frequency occurrences as one of a
kind, not to recur. This may be a particular
concern in the present case where accident
avoidance technology may be improved, so
that industry may believe that past problems
have been solved and, hence, past experience
may be felt to be irrelevant in calculations of
future probabilities. Under such conditionsOpaluch Haz.rdous Waste Accidents 215
subjective probabilities may suffer the so-
called “anchoring” problem (Tversky and
Kahnemann, 1981) whereby they are biased
towards zero and actual experience is not
sufficiently weighted in updating the prob-
abilities.
Hence, a special difficulty may arise when
implementing liability rules in the case of low
probability incidents, although at least some
evidence suggests that this may not be a par-
ticular difficult y (Opaluch and Grigalunas,
1984).
The Monte Carlo Model
This section will describe a simulation model
used to examine the anchoring problem, and
will present the simulation results. Clearly
such a model is quite data intensive, and the
accuracy and availability of data is a primary
difficulty to be dealt with. Due to this
difficulty, the model will examine the issue of
offshore oil production, because this area has
been subject to the greatest degree of study
and because regulations require reporting of
considerable information. Hence, a substan-
tial body of data is readily available for
offshore oil production, technology, and
safety,
For the purpose of this section, the produc-
tion decision is taken as given. Hence the key
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All data employed are obtained from various
documents examining offshore oil production
in the Gulf of Mexico. The model considers
spills in excess of 1,000 barrels, whose proba-
bility is assumed to follow the Poisson dis-
tribution, as is commonly employed (see, for
example, Smith et al., 1982). Hence, the den-
sity function for spills is assumed to be of the
form
p(X = x) = (A)xexp(–A) ~~
forx=O, l,...
The Poisson is a one parameter distribution,
where the parameter, A, is equal to the ex-
pected number of spills. This parameter is as-
sumed to vary over time, depending upon the
level of production and the technology em-
ployed. More specifically, the value of A at
some point in time is assumed to be
At=$t t
where a is an unknown parameter, constant
over time, Qt is the level of production at time
t and Tt is the level of spill control technology
employed at time t, which is constructed so as
to be linear in costs. Employing usual Baye-
sian methods (see DeGroot, 1970, for exam-
ple), a is assumed to follow the gamma dis-
tribution with parameters pl and p2, whose
mean is pl/pz = a, the prior estimate of a. The
parameters PI and Pz are updated according to
the equations
Plo + 1) = Pi(t) + x
p,(t + 1) = p,(t) + 1
hence the prior estimate of a is updated ac-
cording to
a(t + 1) =
Pi(t) + x
p,(t) + 1 “
Thus, the firm is assumed to have a prior
estimate of the probability of spills and
chooses spill control technology so as to
maximize expected profits under the assump-
tions of complete liability for any damages
from spills and no further regulation on spill
control technology. The firm observes the
number of spills (x) which occur with that
technology and uses that information to up-
date its prior probability, which is then used to
choose the optimal level of technology in the
following period.
The parameter p, is known as the spread
parameter of the gamma distribution, and re-
flects the degree of certainty with which the
firm believes in its prior estimate of a, and
hence the degree to which new information
leads to changes in the prior. Hence, by vary-
ing PI and pz proportionately, the issue of in-
sufficient weighting of new information can be
examined. Under the anchoring assumption,
the prior estimate of the expected number of
spills, at given levels of production and tech-
nology, is less than the true expected value,
and p, and Pz are sufficiently large that updat-
ing does not allow appropriate adjustment to
new information.
With information on the probability of spills
as a function of expenditures on spill control216 October 1984
technology, one could construct estimates of
a, a technology index, and the unit cost of
technology, c. Unfortunately, although widely
recognized as important and achievable with
current knowledge (Conrad, 1980; Russell,
1981), this information does not appear to be
currently available, Instead, the parameters
were determined as follows: the unit cost of
spill control technology, c, was arbitrarily set
equal to 1, so that the technology index is
equal to expenditures on spill control technol-
ogy per unit production. The parameter was
then determined from information on expendi-
tures on meeting federal regulations (Shirley,
1981) and an estimate of the expected number
of spills per billion barrels of oil produced
(Lanfear and Amstutz, 1983), Information on
production and total revenues from OCS op-
erations in the Gulf of Mexico from 1964
through 1982 (U. S. Department of Interior,
1983a) were used for time paths for production
and price, While oil spill fate and effects mod-
elling is available (U, S. Department of Inte-
rior, 1983b), no estimates of expected social
costs of spills are given. Hence, the costs of
spills, including damages and cleanup costs,
were constructed from case studies of the
costs of previous spills and an estimated dis-
tribution on the size of spills in the Gulf of
Mexico (Lanfear and Amstutz, 1983).
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of anchoring are constructed with PZequal to
16 and 64 respectively. In all cases, PI is cho-
sen so that the prior estimate, a = PJP2, is
equal to 7.4, or one-fifth of the “true” value,
a. By comparing social costs, including social
damages from spills, cleanup costs, and costs
of spill control technology, under these differ-
ing levels of updating, these results are sug-
gestive of the social losses from anchoring of
prior estimates.
Table I contains the results of the simulation
model. The first three columns contain the
prior estimates of a, averaged over 100 repeti-
tions, as they evolve over the time horizon.
The bottom row contains the average social
cost of spills and spill avoidance for each level
of the parameters, again averaged over 100
repetitions. As can be seen, considerable
damages result in each case. In addition, sig-
nificant differences in costs occur as the pa-
rameters increase by a factor of 16, with their
ratio held fixed. At the highest levels of the
parameters, costs are $247 million or about
$50 million greater than costs at the lowest
level, Spill damage and control costs at opti-
mal management are $97 million. Hence incor-
rect information at the lowest level of anchor-
ing increases costs by a factor of 2.
Table I. Updated Prior Estimates (at) For
Three Levels of Anchoring
Simulation Results
The model was used to simulate the technol-
ogy choice and spill occurrence in the Gulf of
Mexico over the period 1964 to 1982, In order
to evaluate the anchoring problem, firms per-
ceptions of the expected number of spills was
assumed to be one-fifth the true expected
number of spills. Three combinations of the
parameters pl and Pz were chosen so as to
compare three levels of anchoring with initial
perceptions of the probability of spills held
fixed. The lowest values for p, and p2 lead to
relatively low anchoring, so that after a rela-
tively short period of experience with spills,
considerable updating occurs, while the high-
est lead to very little updating, For the lowest
level of anchoring, a value of p2 = 4 is used.
This implies that the firm has the same level of
confidence in its prior estimate as it has in four
years of actual experience, so that the two
would be equally weighted in updating the ex-
pected number of spills, given production and
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Conclusions
This paper examined the use of liability rules
in controlling hazardous substance accidents.
Liability rules can be viewed as a form of
economic incentive for pollution control and
are widely used in current environmental regu-
lation. The success or failure of liabilit y rules
in providing incentives for accident avoidance
should be subject to greater study, given
economists’ emphasis on the superiority of
economic incentives for pollution control.
Several difficulties with current regulation
lead to less than complete financial responsi-
bility y for damages from pollution accidents, In
addition, inappropriate expectations concern-
ing the probability of accidents may lead to
imperfect internalization, particularly in the
case of low probabilityy events. Simulation re-
sults show that excessive confidence in cur-
rent technology can lead to large environmen-
tal costs, both through underestimated prob-
abilities of spills and through insufficient up-
dating of these probabilities as new informa-
tion accumulates. In such case, some form of
direct regulation may be required in place of,
or in addition to, liability for pollution dam-
ages.
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